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TRIBUTE TO RONALD DWORKINt
AND A NOTE ON PRAGMATIC ADJUDICATION
I am honored to be asked to speak at this dedication to Ronald
Dworkin, an illustrious figure in modern legal thought. I was
touched to learn that Dworkin himself had asked me to speak. For
our intellectual relationship is essentially one of antagonism,' even
antipathy. To be an invited skunk at a garden party is an unusual
experience, and one that argues generosity on Dworkin's part, and
perhaps a spirit of mischief on the editors' part. It is only fitting, in
the circumstances, that I should be the caboose on this train of
praise.
Although there are seemingly vast areas of disagreement be-
tween us, 2 I not only respect his work, I agree wholeheartedly with
what may prove to be the most enduring part of it, though predic-
tions of that sort are perilous. I refer to his criticism of positivism,
and specifically of the positivism advocated by H. L. A. Hart in The
Concept of Law. Dworkin has demonstrated convincingly that Ameri-
can judges, at least, are not legal positivists; they (or should I say
we) draw their legal ideas from a variety of sources besides positive,
in the sense of enacted, law. I would like Dworkin to have acknowl-
edged that he was indeed speaking about American judges; much of
the disagreement between him and Hart might have dissolved had
each acknowledged that his own concept of law was not universal
but was based rather on the character of the legal system he knew
best, American in Dworkin's case and English in Hart's-more pre-
cisely the traditional English legal system, for it has, as Dworkin now
emphasizes and Lord Hoffmann's tribute to Dworkin illustrates, be-
gun to evolve in the direction of the American. I even agree with at
least one thing that Dworkin has written in the New York Review of
Books: "we must not allow our Constitution and our shared sense of
decency to become a suicide pact," he wrote in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.3
t This a slightly revised and extended version of remarks delivered on April
17, 2006, on the occasion of the dedication of volume 63 of the N.Y. U. Annual
Survey of American Law to Ronald Dworkin.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal "Theory": A Response to Ronald
Dworkin, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 377 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Dworkin, Polemics, and the
Clinton Impeachment Controversy, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1023 (2000).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 20, 46,
119, 300, 337-38, 350-51 (2003).
3. Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N. Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 28, 2002, at
44, 47. This phrase has its origins in Justice Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v. City of
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I am less happy with other aspects of Dworkin's jurisprudential
thought, such as his distinction between principles and policies and
his insistence on the priority of the former in guiding judges; in his
further insistence on the fusion of constitutional law with moral
theory; in what seems to me the unrealism of his conception ofjudi-
cial capabilities; and in his right-answers thesis. Lord Hoffman in
his tribute to Dworkin embraced Dworkin's conception of judicial
capabilities and his right-answers thesis, and stated that always when
he disagrees with his fellowjudges it is because he thinks he is right
and they are wrong on the legal issue in question. That is not how I
react to most disagreements with my fellow judges. Sometimes I
think I am right and they are wrong, but in the really interesting
cases I am more apt to think that right and wrong do not enter the
picture, that we disagree not because one of us has made a mistake
but because, as a consequence of differences in values, tempera-
ment, life experience, or our conceptions of the judicial function,
we are not reasoning from common premises.
As for Dworkin's derision of pragmatism (philosophical as well
as legal)-to which he has applied such terms as "dog's dinner"4
and "empty,"5 comparing me both to a "bulldog"6 and to an "os-
trich ' 7 (covering quite a lot of ground in the bestiary)-there we
are at complete loggerheads. The fundamental difference between
us is that he believes that there is such a thing as moral reasoning
and that it should guide judges, and I, while not doubting that
there is such a thing as morality and that it influences law, believe
that moral reasoning is just a fancy name for political contention.
But remember the words I used in describing our differ-
ences-seemingly vast areas of disagreement between us; this
formula allows for the possibility that the disagreements between us
may not really run very deep, that they may be largely a matter of
our using different vocabularies to express our views of sound pub-
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). What Justice Jackson actually said was: "The choice is
not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without
either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with
a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a sui-
cide pact." Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
4. Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Rights, Answers and True Banality, in PRAGMA-
TISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359, 360 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
5. Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy & Monica Lewinsky, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Mar. 9,
2000, at 48, 52 (reviewing RicHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGA-
TION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRiAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999) and RicHARD A. Pos-
NER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)).
6. Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, I11 HARv. L. REV. 1718 (1998).
7. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. L. J. 353, 375-76 (1997).
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lic policy and the judicial duty to implement them. A graduate stu-
dent in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Lisa Van Alstyne,
is writing an interesting doctoral thesis in which she denounces
Dworkin and me as a pair of functionalists both of whom in our
separate ways have grievously misconceived the character of tort
law.8
I can't go much deeper into such matters here, though in the
extension of these remarks below I amplify my view of our disagree-
ment a bit. For I must save time to say a word about Dworkin the
critic. He is of course a polemicist of remarkable power and a dis-
tinct ruthlessness; if you have any doubt about the ruthlessness, ask
Robert Bork, who is still smarting. I too have felt the lash of Dwor-
kin's critical polemics-on more than one occasion, but most dra-
matically when in a review of my book on Clinton's impeachment
(in Mr. Silvers' journal) he accused me of having violated the ca-
nons of judicial conduct by discussing Clinton's travails before the
theoretical (and it was merely theoretical) possibility of an indict-
ment against that miscreant had been extinguished, though after
Clinton was acquitted by the U.S. Senate.9 It is the only time, in my
24 years as ajudge, that I've been accused of ajudicial impropriety.
Fortunately, who should ride to my rescue but John Frank, a crusty
old lawyer (since deceased) of indubitable rectitude, probity, stuffi-
ness, and distinction, who wrote a letter to the New York Review of
Books where Dworkin's criticism of me had appeared in which he
said, no, Posner had not violated the canons of judicial ethics, he
had merely demonstrated very bad taste. 10 Well, since de gustibus
non est disputandum, Frank's timely intervention may have saved me
from the ignominy of a reprimand by higher judicial authority, a
fate that my friend Judge Guido Calabresi, after publicly comparing
President Bush to both Hitler and Mussolini, rather to Bush's disad-
vantage-and this at the height of the 2004 Presidential election
campaign-was unable to escape.1'
But this is not the whole story of Dworkin the critic. An article
that he wrote many years ago forcefully criticizing my views about
wealth maximization,1 2 though it overstated his case, was convinc-
8. For an early version, see Lisa Van Alstyne, A Failure to Secure the Auton-
omy of Legal Norms: Andrei Marmor's Positive Law and Objective Values 8-12
(2006) (on file with author).
9. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 48.
10. John P. Frank, A Question of Ethics, N.Y. REv. Boos, May 25, 2000, at 63.
11. See Mark Hamblett, Council Finds Judge's Apology Fulfills Sanction, N.Y. L. J.,
Apr. 13, 2005, at 2.
12. Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
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ing and caused me to alter those views, albeit grudgingly of course,
and with a lag. I am grateful for the criticism. Dworkin the critic is
seen at his most constructive-and by many of you in this room, I
am sure-in the law and philosophy colloquium over which he pre-
sides both here and at University College in London. I have had
the privilege and pleasure of presenting large swatches of book
manuscripts three times at the colloquium. Not only the insights
that Dworkin generously shares with the speakers on those occa-
sions, the discussions that he orchestrates, and the improvements in
my books that have resulted, but also the courtesy with which he
delivers his penetrating criticisms, make these occasions memora-
ble and wipe out the smart of our combats.
At the dinner following the tributes to Dworkin, he took the
podium and a brief exchange ensued between the two of us. Recur-
ring to my remarks about the difference between Lord Hoffman's
Dworkinian conception of judicial method and mine, Dworkin
asked me how I could decide a case on any basis other than a view
of what the right decision was. I answered as follows: For the judge,
the duty to decide the case (and with reasonable dispatch) is pri-
mary. He does not choose his cases, or the sequence in which they
are presented to him, or decree a leisurely schedule on which to
decide them. This is something that law professors have difficulty
understanding, since they choose their topics and need not let go
of a paper until they are satisfied that they are right. I have felt in a
number of cases that I was skating on thin ice. I did not feel that I
had the luxury to defer decision until certitude descended on me.
Often at my level of the judiciary (less often in the Supreme
Court), the judges do share the premises of decision-they agree
for example that the purpose of contract law is to promote effi-
ciency in transactions-and when that is so, a decision based on
instrumental reason is possible. Pragmatism can help guide the
reasoning process in such a case by inviting the judges to consider
practical consequences-what decision will conduce to achieving
the purpose of the area of law in question? And Dworkin asked, but
what about the cases in which the judges do not agree on the prem-
ises of decision? How can pragmatism help them then? Those are
cases in what I call the open area, where the conventional materials
of judicial decision-making run out and the judges, if they are to
decide the case rather than throw up their hands, are compelled to
make a legislative judgment. Such a judgment, like that of the offi-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
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cial legislature, will inevitably reflect the preferences of the legisla-
tor-judge, and so we should ask how legislators' preferences are
formed when they are not under strong pressure from their constit-
uents' 3-when they have, in basketball parlance, a free shot. The
answer is that legislators in their open area are guided by values,
temperament, life experiences, and their conception of the scope
and limits of the legislative function. You can disagree with their
judgment and give reasons for your disagreement, but rarely can
you say they are wrong. And so it is with judges. All that is clear-
and it is not nothing-is that we want legislators to think hard
about the consequences of proposed legislation, and we should
want judges to do likewise when the mantle of legislator is thrust
upon them. Would Dworkin disagree?
RICHARD A. POSNER
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School
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